From Deterrence to Dilemma: Nuclear Modernisation in the Indo-Pacific

By Tisha Porel 

 "The deterrence value of a nuclear weapon depends on its accuracy, reliability, and the adversary’s perception of its credibility.”

~ George P. Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State

This article encompasses the study of the nuclear landscape in the Indo-Pacific region. Currently there are four notable nuclear powers in this region, namely- India, China, Pakistan and North Korea. These powers are rapidly modernising their arsenals by improving warhead design, delivery systems, command and control structure. This rapid nuclear modernisation is further infuriating geopolitical tensions in this region. There is no concept of disarmament present in the Indo-Pacific and nuclear powers maintain almost complete secrecy regarding their arsenals which only fuels mutual suspicion. 

Growing popularity of Nukes in Indo-Pacific Region 

The reason that nuclear weapons proliferated so fast in the Indo-Pacific region is that, firstly, it brought political prestige, influence and recognition for third world developing countries. Secondly, nuclear weapons acted as a regional stabilizer in the Indo-Pacific. Colonial history of division sparked border conflict between China, India and Pakistan as well as between North Korea and South Korea. In this context, nuclear weapons were used by these nations to stabilise regional conflict and gain a certain amount of protection against each other. On the global stage, this weapon provided a powerful political card which enabled less powerful nations to stand on equal footing with powerful nations. For instance, North Korea and the USA set up a one-on-one meeting in the 2018 Singapore summit where both parties were supposed to negotiate regarding denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. This Summit can be considered a victory for North Korea as this small nation bagged a lucrative deal of U.S. military exercises with Japan and South Korea in exchange for a vague commitment to denuclearization. At present, all four nuclear states in the Indo-Pacific are rapidly expanding and modernising nuclear forces by incorporating new technologies in their nuclear triad. 

Nuclear Modernisation in Indo-Pacific

Scholars like Thomas C. Shelling and Bernard Brodie advocated the fact that quantity does not matter when it comes to nuclear weapons because, unlike conventional arms, it cannot be used repeatedly without catastrophic consequences. A 2014 study conducted by Michael J. Mills revealed that even a regional conflict between India and Pakistan, involving nuclear weapons can trigger nuclear war; if each side decides to detonate 50 weapons of 15 kiloton each. So, even with fewer weapons effective deterrence can be established if accuracy, reliability and credibility is ensured. A huge arsenal is meaningless if it is not rationally deployed and strategically delivered. In recent years, nuclear-armed states have increasingly recognized this principle. China is modernizing its relatively small arsenal to increase survivability, reliability, safety and permeating ability. According to latest SIPRI reports, India has slightly increased the size of its arsenal bringing a total of 180 warheads. Arms control organisation report showcases Pakistan’s growing arsenal with approximately 170 warheads. In this context, North Korea started late in the nuclear game but aggressively expanded its arsenal within a short duration. 

Rising Tension Across the Indo-Pacific 

Most nations in the Indo-pacific region stay in a constant state of warfare with heavily militarised borders. India, China, Pakistan and North Korea, South Korea borders are the most hostile borders in the world where border skirmishes are quite frequent. In this context, all these nations are investing heavily in modernising nuclear triad to ensure a second-strike ability which means these states have the ability to retaliate if they get attacked with nuclear or any other weapon of mass destruction. Accordingly, in East Asia North Korea possesses nuclear weapons but states like South Korea and Japan possess virtual nuclear capability (VNC). Virtual nuclear capability means the ability of a nation to develop nuclear weapons within a small timeframe if the nation feels the need. As per the view of Horvath Paloczi George (1998), theoretically any nation with civil-nuclear power-plants, a sufficient industrial infrastructure and scientifically skilled people; can be considered as VNCS even if the nation never had any military nuclear ambitions in the past. India, Pakistan, North Korea all fell under this category once. Japan, South Korea are under the protection of the USA nuclear umbrella but if the United States withdraws its protective hand and North Korea further modernises its arsenal, these nations could pursue their own nuclear programme and succeed in no time. 

Conclusion 

Nuclear states often use nuclear rhetoric when facing existential crises, for instance, recently Pakistan Field Marshal Asim Munir threatened India for suspending certain provisions of the Indus Water treaty. Nuclear is mostly used as a threat card yet there are chances that accidents can cause misunderstanding between hostile nations. In recent times, public as well as political concerns appear to have relaxed regarding this topic as nations feel more relaxed in the shade of these dangerous weapons. During the cold war, public and policymakers were far more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states than they are today. Driven by this fear, they were willing to take all possible risks, created innovative ideas, signed a lot of treaties to curb nuclear proliferation and excessive nuclear armament. Given the changing tide of politics in the Indo-Pacific region nuclear stability can no longer be taken for granted and the world needs to be more cautious and sceptic about growing nuclear modernisation in this region. 

Tisha Porel is a postgraduate in Defence and Strategic Studies, Central University of Gujarat. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies.