By Aman Yadav
Geopolitical conflicts are actively transforming the global order. The ongoing war in Ukraine is testing Russian strength. China’s persistent insistence menaces Taiwan, and the US-Israel conflict with Iran directly undermines US global influence. It is very important for India’s present foreign policy to test India’s ability to manage its relationship with two major power blocks while securing its own national interests.
One of the most influential and powerful platforms in the international order today is BRICS and QUAD, which hold immense potential to shape, guide, promote, and protect the interests of their member nations. India is a mutual member of both BRICS and QUAD, which are two very different alliances, one led by a focus on global south leadership and financial cooperation and the other focusing on strategic and maritime safety in the Indo-Pacific.
India has mastered the art of flawless dual engagement.
As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India looked up to balance its relations with both superpowers. By deliberately avoiding the alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union, skillfully maintaining a careful balance between the rival power blocks.
However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India started changing its stance and shifting its policy from non-alignment to multi-alignment, which means India can now engage with numerous groupings simultaneously without becoming dependent on any particular group or nation. This shows the core element of India’s foreign policy, which is the principle of strategic autonomy. That is, India chooses wisely the issues rather than choosing any sides.
QUAD, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, has its member nations as the US, Japan, and Australia, along with India. This group mainly focuses on promoting free and inclusive maritime order. Its core area is maritime security, freedom of navigation, and sharing of critical technologies. For India, it is very essential to secure its energy line, which passes through the Indo-Pacific routes, which has now become a very volatile sea route in the world. For India Quad is very important for various reasons such as managing China’s rise as the growing footprint of China in Indian ocean and south China sea will automatically creates strategic pressure for India. Unlike China, India wants a rule-based international order, which demands maritime security and strategic partnership with the United States in the field of semiconductors and its supply chains regarding intelligence sharing and defense cooperation, which gives India an edge over its adversaries in the region. India is also very cautious, as it does not want to annoy China while making QUAD a formal military alliance, as it wants to protect its strategic autonomy.
BRICS, on the other hand, is a forum of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa and is now expanding further. Unlike QUAD, BRICS focuses mainly on economic assistance and reform in present global governance. It provides platform for newly emerged economies to become an alternative for western-dominated institutions like IMF, World Bank, UNO, etc.
For India, BRICS serves as a vital platform to champion the interests of developing nations and project its leadership within the Global South. BRICS is mainly about spreading soft power like diplomacy and development rather than military power.
While looking at India’s involvement in the QUAD and BRICS, at first it looks contradictory given China’s adversarial role in the former and central presence in the latter; it actually reflects the smart and more practical diplomatic strategy of India. As for security and rule-based order, New Delhi coordinates with the QUAD, while for global economic governance it immerses with BRICS. This is not an institutional contradiction but an exact manifestation of issue-based alignment.
Yet, balancing both platforms is no simple task, as sometimes it becomes a matter of suspicious activities for Washington, especially during high-level debates over topics like de-dollarization. Further, if India did not maintain its robust involvement within the forum or distance itself or even exhibit a passive stance, then it would grant China a free hand to dominate the institution entirely.
Thirdly, while New Delhi comfortably embraces Quad communiques focusing on security challenges in the South China Sea, a shift toward a structured military alliance could test India's strategic boundaries. Consolidating the BRICS into a rigid and unified military grouping would be incompatible with India's core principle of strategic autonomy, as New Delhi firmly disagrees with the concept of an institutionalized ‘Asian NATO.'
Fourth, India's handy relationship with Russia creates another level of diplomatic pressure from Western nations, so India must continuously balance expectations from multiple sides.
Consequently, the most appropriate diplomatic approach for New Delhi involves promoting cooperation without any legally binding commitment. Considering its complex geographical realities, India must emphasize strategic partnerships while cautiously avoiding dependency on any specific power bloc. By positioning itself as a key bridge between the Eastern and Western hemispheres, India strongly champions its signature doctrine of "strategic autonomy." Ultimately, this multifaceted approach demonstrates India’s emergence as a robust and independent major power within an increasing multipolar global architecture.
Aman Yadav is a PhD Research Scholar at Ranchi University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies.
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