By Annie Pruthi
In July 2025, India participated in Exercise Talisman Sabre, a multinational military exercise led by Australia. Launched in 2005, this year marked the 11th edition of Exercise Talisman Sabre and, notably, witnessed India’s first participation. Designed bilaterally by Australia and the United States of America and planned multilaterally, this exercise is the largest conducted by Australia. Primarily, the objective of such exercise is to evaluate the ability of respective forces to organise and carry out joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational) military operations. It also seeks to increase the interoperability and combat readiness of the USA and Australia’s forces, as well as of the other partner nations.
India was one of the 19 nations participating in the 11th edition of Exercise Talisman Sabre. In the first such move, the participation in this military drill signalled New Delhi’s expanding role in the Indo-Pacific security architecture and showcased the deepening defence ties with Canberra. This participation should not be mistaken for a symbolic gesture, as it signifies something significant, i.e., a strategic alignment with Australia and New Delhi’s intention to actively contribute to the development of regional stability while achieving operational interoperability.
As per reports from the Australian Government, over 35,000 soldiers from 19 countries—including Canada, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Kingdom—participated over the course of three weeks this July. The observer countries included Malaysia and Vietnam. A variety of sites, including both defence and non-defence training locations, were utilised during TS25. These locations offer a practical demonstration of how a sizeable military force ought to operate across a wide range of terrain. All military domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—benefited from TS25's locations and ranges. Military personnel were deployed at various locations, including Queensland, Northern Territory, Western Australia, New South Wales and Christmas Island. In another first, the activities of Exercise Talisman Sabre were also conducted outside of Australia – in its neighbouring country, Papua New Guinea.
Exercise Talisman Sabre intends to advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, strengthen the regional security architecture among allied nations and partners, and improve military preparedness, interoperability, and combined operational capabilities. TS25 aimed to enhance combined warfighting skills through live-fire drills, field training, amphibious landings, ground force manoeuvres, air combat, maritime operations, and force preparation exercises.
A pertinent question to ask, then, is what India’s participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre indicates? Firstly, this participation holds strategic significance. While India is not a formal ally of either Australia or the USA, it is a part of the Australian-US security network. It also strengthens the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and India's Act East Policy. Further, it increases India's visibility as a source of net security provider in the Indian Ocean and the surrounding waters. This participation is also seen as an attempt by New Delhi to reinforce its presence in the QUAD. Since two partners of the QUAD, i.e., the USA and Australia, are the principal hosts of Exercise Talisman Sabre, while Japan is also a participant of this exercise, India’s participation showcases that New Delhi does not hesitate to be a part of various security initiatives, as and when required. Although it has often been reiterated that QUAD is not a military alliance, exercises like Malabar and Talisman Sabre showcase the alignment of interests of the participating countries, from maritime coordination to interoperability.
Furthermore, India’s participation sends a signal to China. In light of China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Pacific Islands, India's involvement sends an effective deterrent signal. It reaffirms a shared commitment to maintaining a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific based on peaceful maritime cooperation, respect for international law, and sovereignty. Lieutenant General Joel B. Vowell, Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, emphasised the multifaceted objectives of Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 by underscoring how the participating forces are strengthening practical military cooperation and reinforcing a shared strategic vision. According to his remarks, the exercise is not only enhancing “tactical trust” and refining joint operational manoeuvres, but also demonstrating a sustained commitment to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific.
According to a press release by the Press Information Bureau, Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CISC), Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit, visited Australia on 26–28 July 2025, to witness TS25. The MoD has emphasised how these multilateral exercises allow the Indian Armed Forces to showcase its defence diplomacy and provide an opportunity to effectively contribute to a stable Indo-Pacific. It has been reiterated that the exercise offers an incredible opportunity to strengthen military-to-military ties, share strategic ideas, and support India's goal of cooperative security engagements.
India's defence partnership with Australia also benefited greatly from its involvement in Talisman Sabre 2025. Through initiatives like the Air-to-Air Refuelling Pact (2024), the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (2020), and the AUSINDEX naval exercises, the engagement expands upon the expanding base of bilateral military cooperation. The two forces' operational reach and coordination have gradually improved as a result of these agreements, enabling smooth supply, maintenance, and refuelling support across each other's sites. By promoting joint doctrine evolution, enhancing interoperability across services, and promoting defence industry collaboration in cutting-edge fields like shipbuilding, drone technology, and maritime surveillance, participation in an extensive exercise like Talisman Sabre continues this cooperation.
TS25 complements India’s participation in other major multilateral and bilateral exercises, including Exercise Malabar (held annually with the USA, Japan and Australia), the MILAN exercise (hosted by the Indian Navy with both a harbour phase and a sea phase) and AUSINDEX (held by the Indian Navy and the Royal Australian Navy every two years). Through TS25, India can interact with a multinational coalition led by Australia, which includes the United States, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. India is able to enhance inter-service cooperation, develop its joint operational capabilities, and learn about cutting-edge combat technology and doctrines as a result of this synergy.
For Canberra, this can be seen as an opportunity to diversify its traditional reliance on the USA and enable engagement with a capable and trusted partner in the Indo-Pacific. It would not be wrong to state that this participation also contributes to strengthening cooperation between India and Australia and moves from diplomacy to synergy. For New Delhi, participation in TS25 serves as a vital link between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific theatre and helps improve regional stability. Exercises like TS25 can significantly improve India's readiness for maritime emergencies, bolster its position as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific, and serve to create an enduring partnership of like-minded countries dedicated to freedom of navigation and prosperity based on international law.
In the future, New Delhi will have the task of transforming such sophisticated exercises into long-term operational results through increased military technology cooperation, frequent joint training, and increased interoperability. Meanwhile, India must continue to walk the tightrope between the much-cherished strategic autonomy and its various engagements in an evolving multipolar world order. To that end, India’s participation in TS25 is only a beginning to that effort.
Annie Pruthi is a PhD Scholar at University of Delhi. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies.
KIIPS is a premiere think-tank that intends to provide a platform to academics, researchers, scholars and experts from across the country and abroad.