The following is the keynote speech delivered by Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House
Indo-Pacific Strategic Churn: Challenges and State Responses, edited by Professor Chintamani Mahapatra, comprises an introduction written by him and 16 essays contributed by experienced yet young academics from across India.
It is an invaluable treasure mine of viewpoints and perspectives on the geostrategy, geopolitics, and geoeconomics of our region, defined by the two oceans – the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is also timely, useful, and thought-provoking, inviting reflection, discussion, and debate. Hence, the organization of this Roundtable is a wise step towards crafting a broad consensus on the analysis, possible informed predictions, and, above all, recommendations, especially for policymakers in India.
Besides, it also represents an endeavour by those present here to update the conclusions of the volume, perhaps because there is always an inevitable interval between the submission of essays by the authors and the release of a published compendium.
I warmly congratulate the editor, the authors, and the publisher of this monumental work. I am confident that it will remain relevant and useful to all future scholars of Indo-Pacific affairs for a long time to come.
It is customary for one delivering the keynote speech on this occasion to dwell on at least some of the principal issues dealt with in the volume. I do so with humility and deep awareness of the fact that, one, I bring in a practitioner’s viewpoint, and two, the inside-outside perspective.
I have focused on studying the vast region stretching from Africa through IOR and South Asia to Southeast Asia, Japan, and Australia. In other words, my knowledge of US foreign policy, the EU’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific, Russian and Chinese policy orientations, and developments in the Korean Peninsula is not direct; instead, it is derived from specialists and experts I respect. Perhaps I am in good company, because the subject of the Indo-Pacific is so vast, diverse, and multidimensional that one must be a very brave scholar to claim that one knows all relevant aspects equally well!
In oceanic science, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has been used for a long time, but its use in the realm of geopolitics perhaps began only in the first decade of the 21st century. When, in March 2013, my senior colleagues and I, as DG, at the Indian Council of World Affairs, became instrumental in hosting what was perhaps the first international academic conference in India on Indo-Pacific developments, it did require a special effort to convince the authorities concerned in Delhi before the External Affairs Minister graciously agreed to address participants at its concluding session. Minister Salman Khurshid discussed the concept of the Indo-Pacific as a logical extension of India’s Look East Policy, suggesting that the Indo-Pacific may be viewed as a spatial concept where the strengths and complementarities of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean can be fully leveraged.
From then onwards, India progressively bought the concept. Earlier, it was much influenced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s articulation of the ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, as reflected in his address before the Indian Parliament on 22 August 2007.
Cut swiftly to 2020, which marked the commencement of the ‘Age of Polycrisis’, encompassing COVID-19, the Russia-Ukraine war, multiple conflicts in West Asia, and other flashpoints around the world. As a result, the prominence assigned to the Indo-Pacific as a concept, vision, policy, and strategy during the previous decade has eroded. Diplomatic and media attention shifted to other regions and other issues. In this context, this Palgrave publication, representing the collective wisdom of a range of Indian academic leaders, has sought to reposition the Indo-Pacific as a focal point, a region India considers vital to its interests and its global standing.
Among the factors that define the Indo-Pacific today, the strategic rivalry between the US and China stands out remarkably. The relationship between the two largest economies – whether one of competition, cooperation, confrontation, or a fluctuating mix of all three – will shape power dynamics, influencing the prospects for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.
It is ironic that the Trump administration 1.0, which did so much to confront and counter China’s coercive behaviour in the previous decade, is now followed by the Trump administration 2.0 in this decade, showing a clear preference for strategic conciliation with China, as established in the Trump-Xi Jinping meeting on 30 October 2025.
Furthermore, the serious strain in US-India relations, the indefinite postponement of the Quad summit, which was due to take place this month in Delhi, and the likelihood of President Trump‘s visit to China and President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US – both scheduled for 2026 – have their own story to tell. Even if the prospects of G2 are overstated, it is prudent to study and assess how the Indo-Pacific may look in the next three years if the US and China accommodate each other’s security and economic concerns. What will be the impact on India and its strategic partners in the Quad and others?
This question assumes special significance for two reasons in particular: the rapprochement between China and India stands at a critical stage today, and the forthcoming visit of President Vladimir Putin to India in early December 2025 presents an exceptional opportunity to add further substance and momentum to India-Russia relations. How will these two trends impact the power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and, especially, the trajectory of India-US relations in the next three years of the Trump presidency? This question will merit close watching. That the exigencies of its strategic autonomy will guide New Delhi and the imperative of maintaining strategic resilience in its relations with major power centers, including the EU, UK, Japan, and the Global South, is a given.
The tasks and challenges before South Block are likely to become more complex in the coming years. That is where policymakers are well advised to consult widely and listen to informed voices.
For those of us on this side of the fence, i.e., our academic and think tank community, there is a pressing need to debate and arrive at some conclusions on finding answers to at least the following five questions:
Do we expect the Indo-Pacific to experience armed conflicts, peace, or ‘a no-peace-no-war situation’ in the near future?
Are flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific – IOR, India-China border, South China and East China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula – likely to flare up, simmer, or cool down in the medium term?
How to assess the scope and impact of the escalating arms race in the region?
Is the Quad essential for stability in the face of China’s growing aggressiveness? If so, should three nations – India, Japan, and Australia – work towards a Quad 2.0, in case the US eventually withdraws its support?
What are the key geo-economic implications of the prevailing power divide in the Indo-Pacific?
In the end, may I congratulate again the makers of this book, which was launched today. I would like to express my deep appreciation to you all for focusing the spotlight on a subject of immense collective interest to us.
Thank you for your attention.
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