Published on 17th April 2025
The Indo-Pacific is not a geography but a living and contested space where economic interests, strategic imperatives, and historical claims converge. Border conflicts in this area—from the South China Sea to the India-China border-are not simply lines on maps. They have profound human costs and touch the lives of millions who rely on these seas and shores for their well-being, security, and sense of self.
At the centre of this shifting geopolitical map is India. Being a regional power with historical interests, economic interests, and security interests, India is both directly and indirectly involved in these conflicts. From answering Chinese belligerence at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), protecting maritime lanes, or conversing with ASEAN and Quad partners, India's position is anything but passive. It is a country that has to walk a tightrope between diplomacy and deterrence, cooperation and confrontation.
As the world order undergoes severe stress and strain with tectonic shifts in global power distribution, and the rise of mercurial leaders like US President Donald Trump, the geopolitics and geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific region is passing through one of its most uncertain times. Different permutations and combinations are being discussed and deliberated upon, regarding the emerging security and economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region, as powers, big and small respond to the upheavals caused by Trump’s tariffs and his approach to dealing with allies and adversaries. In the midst of these profound changes, India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region, and its evolving role becomes all the more crucial to assess and analyze. Therefore, the theme ‘India in the Indo-Pacific’ became the subject of a very invigorating discussion among the research interns of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS). This compendium is a collection of their views and thoughts. It reflects the perception of young Indian scholars and their opinions on international affairs, especially the evolving role of India in the Indo-Pacific region. These views expressed in the short commentaries are entirely of the concerned scholars and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the KIIPS as an institution.
India’s Key Partners in the Indo-Pacific Region
*Archana Paswan
With the change in the current geopolitical scenario, the Indo-Pacific region has gained immense prominence in global geo-politics. There has been a shift away from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region represents the ‘new strategic reality’ of the 21st century. The region has emerged as a ‘new theater for strategic competition’ that shapes the security architecture and regional dynamics of present global landscape. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a major economic hub that accounts for more than 65% of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The region is economically important as half of total global trade passes through this region. The region facilitates over 80% of the world’s maritime trade and is home to 64% of the global population.
India being strategically located in the Indo-Pacific region, has emerged as a key player in this region. India sees the Indo-Pacific as a vast ocean of economic opportunities where it can expand its strategic footprint. India has been one of the pioneers in formulating the concept of Indo-Pacific region. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the 2018 Shangri-la Dialogue called for “an open and inclusive order in the Indo-Pacific based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nation.” India’s Indo-Pacific strategy can be seen in the light of its “Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)” and “Indian Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI)”. Forging partnerships with like-minded countries is at the core of India’s Indo-Pacific vision. India seeks to enhance its cooperation and collaboration with its key partners that includes the United States (US), Japan, Australia and France in order to ensure peace, stability and prosperity in the region.
The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a pivotal geopolitical area for India and the United States. The strategic partnership between India and the United States in the Indo-Pacific is based on their shared vision for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Both the nations have strengthened their defence cooperation. According to many analysts, the defence partnership between India and US has experienced an “incredible and unprecedented amount of momentum.” The US-India partnership in the Indo-Pacific is mainly driven by the impetus to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region while balancing China’s growing assertiveness and amplifying the trade and economic ties.
On the other hand, Japan sees India as an “indispensable partner” in the Indo-Pacific region. Tokyo and New Delhi promote their common idea of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).” The two maritime democracies seek to ensure freedom of navigation and safeguard maritime security in the region. India, in 2015 released its first joint statement on the Indo-Pacific with Japan, entitled “India and Japan Vision 2025: Special, Strategic and Global Partnership working together for peace and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific region and the world” which showcases the commitment of both the nations to work for ‘peace, security and development’ of the Indo-Pacific region.
France is among one of India’s key partners in the Indo-Pacific. France seeks to deepen and intensify its defence cooperation with India and other like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific. Both India and France have reaffirmed their commitment to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region based on mutual trust and fair regional order. New Delhi and Paris have shared their mutual vision of fostering global peace and stability in the form of “Horizon 2047” roadmap. Both the nations aspire to build their partnership based on mutual trust, economic growth and prosperity. The partnership aims to enhance their cooperation in the Indo-Pacific by strengthening their economic ties and bolstering military cooperation.
Australia, being a key partner of India, calls for a “secure and prosperous” Indo-Pacific region. The Australia-India Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative Partnership (AIIPOIP) seeks to secure an “open, inclusive, resilient, prosperous and rules-based maritime order” by moulding maritime cooperation along with region wide trade and investments in the region. Australia and India work together to enhance their naval capabilities, and further broaden their defence cooperation. Both of these nations conduct a bilateral naval exercise (AUSINDEX, AUSTRAHIND) that boosts their collective defence capabilities and strengthens maritime ties. Australia, along with India, Japan and the United States constitute the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) that shapes the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. All these nations together participate in the Malabar Naval exercise that enhances interoperability, stability, security, and cooperation in the region.
Apart from these primary partnerships, India also collaborates and fosters its ties with other like-minded nations like South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and other island nations. India also shares a very crucial partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that lies at the centre of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. ASEAN has published “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (2019) that endeavors to promote maritime security and regional connectivity. Thus, India shares a common inclusive vision of the Indo-Pacific region with ASEAN.
One of India's emerging partnerships in the lieu of Indo-Pacific region is with South Korea. Both South Korea and India are the staunch champions of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific region. South Korea has formalized its Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) based on three principles - “Inclusiveness, trust and reciprocity.” South Korea and India strive together to mold the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. The partnership between India and South Korea holds significant potential for economic and maritime domains in the Indo-Pacific region.
Thus, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the primary theatre for major powers’ competition-cooperation dynamic. India being a resident power in this region enjoys a very significant position. India defines the Indo-Pacific as the region that extends from the eastern coast of Africa to the western coast of America. Along with its key partners, India seeks to ensure maritime security and cooperation, freedom of navigation, peaceful settlement of maritime disputes and further aims to improve connectivity in this region. China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region has been a common concern of all these nations. Apart from economic advantages, India’s orientation in the Indo-Pacific region and its key partnerships, can also be seen as a response in countering China’s growing assertiveness.
Maritime Security
*Soulina Dey
As K.M. Panikkar had pointed out several decades back, India's security continues to be firmly dependent on its naval strength and its capacity to maintain peace and security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India’s unique positioning as an ascendant power in the Indian Ocean Region, which acts as a vital maritime trade corridor linking the East and the West, grants it a strategic advantage in projecting its influence and safeguarding its national interests.
Although the Indian Maritime Doctrine characterizes maritime security as “freedom from threats at or from the sea,” it fails to clearly outline a definition of maritime security for India, leading to varying interpretations among its military and civilian agencies. As the foundational doctrines like Indian Maritime Doctrine and Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, were issued by the Indian Navy, India’s conception of maritime security primarily revolves around the Indian Navy. However, the Indian Coast Guard, Marine Police, and other agencies provide critical support in ensuring air, surface and underwater security in the IOR.
India’s strategy is largely focused on naval deterrence i.e., maintaining a strong presence of the Indian Navy in the IOR. Although India has traditionally focused on military aspects of maritime security, it has recognized the importance of the non-military aspects. To address traditional as well as non-traditional maritime threats, such as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing, India has invested significantly to enhance its blue-water capabilities. The launch of India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, in 2022 was a huge step towards strengthening India’s naval capabilities. Programs like the Sagar Mala Project, integrating coastal infrastructure with security initiatives and Project 75 and 75I submarine programs, were established to further this cause. India partakes in several multilateral exercises, such as the Malabar naval exercises, and partnerships like the QUAD & Indian Ocean Rim Association, illustrating its commitment to collective maritime security.
India’s approach towards maritime security was drastically altered after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks in 2008, which exposed its significant vulnerabilities, particularly in coastal surveillance, intelligence coordination, and response mechanisms. This attack prompted several definitive initiatives aimed at enhancing coastal and offshore security, such as engaging the NC3I Network, Coastal Surveillance Radar System, introducing the Coastal Security Bill, and creating the National Maritime Domain Awareness Project. The Indian Navy was designated as the primary maritime security coordinator responsible for coastal defence coordination. It was the same year that India initiated the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. India went on to put further emphasis on MDA in recent years, as was highlighted in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015), designating it as central to the Information–Decision–Action cycle. The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region established in 2018, formed the cornerstone of India’s MDA strategy. The Indian government also introduced the role of a National Maritime Security Coordinator in 2022, to address the issues of inter-agency friction caused by the lack of a national-level coordinating body for maritime security.
China's expanding influence and growing network of ports and infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean, poses a crucial challenge to maritime security in the IOR. Budgetary constraints pose another challenge towards India's naval modernization and research & development in naval technology. India has been integrating AI, satellite-based monitoring, and UAVs like the MQ-9B drones acquired from US, to improve MDA capabilities. India aspires to be fully self-reliant, in critical naval defence technologies by 2047, reducing dependence on foreign sources.
India’s maritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific, rooted in the principles of strategic deterrence, maritime security, and regional cooperation, reflects its aspirations to emerge as a regional power dedicated to upholding security and stability. India's commitment to self-reliance, multilateral engagement, and intent to uphold a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, positions it uniquely to address these challenges.
SAGAR: Enhancing India’s Leadership in the Indo-Pacific
*Bishwarupa Kar
As India celebrates ten years of the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative in 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Mauritius comes full circle. Launched in 2015, the SAGAR initiative had gained impetus through Modi’s speech in Mauritius that chalked out the vision for the then newly elected government to increase India’s foothold in the Indo-Pacific. A decade later, the vision that has manifested into reality deserves a closer look in terms of the role it plays in India’s evolving role in the region.
Over the last ten years, India’s position in the Indo-Pacific, especially the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), has transitioned from being a member to becoming a leader. With the growth of the developing nations in the region, the relevance of the IOR has shot up to new heights in the contemporary multipolar world order. This has presented abundant opportunities for India in trade, security, and broader maritime matters.
At the same time, while growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has posed a challenge to India’s traditional sphere of influence in the IOR, it has incentivized India to turn crisis into opportunity by deepening its engagements with regional powers through a more proactive foreign policy towards its neighbours. This has manifested through the Neighbourhood First Policy, in which the SAGAR initiative has had significant contributions.
With the aim to promote cooperation among IOR states for counter-piracy, trade, tourism, and infrastructure via maritime cooperation, naval security, and economic development, the SAGAR initiative has helped secure India’s role as a net security provider. As an important component of the Neighbourhood First Policy, the initiative has adopted a two-pronged approach of simultaneous bilateral and multilateral engagements. On the one hand, India has deepened its individual ties with the smaller regional powers while, on the other hand, India has optimized its regional cooperation through platforms such as BIMSTEC, ASEAN, IORA, and QUAD.
Built over the last ten years, this strategy has brought about a rapprochement between India and its neighbours. This has been visible in Modi’s visits to Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and Seychelles in 2015, President Kovind’s visits to Madagascar and Djibouti in the following years, and the invitation of the heads of states of Mauritius and Seychelles for the swearing-in ceremony of Modi 3.0 in 2024.
On the ground, the developmental partnerships have been backed by foreign assistance from India through lines of credit (LOC), loans and grants. As of August 2024, India has extended a total LOC of $32 billion to its Neighbourhood First Policy, one-fourth of which has gone to Bangladesh ($7.8 billion), $2 billion to Sri Lanka, followed by around a billion dollars each to Nepal and the Maldives and $745 million to Myanmar. To put things into perspective, the priority India gives to its neighbours, approximately $13.5 billion in total, was extended to Africa, South America, and Oceania combined! Simultaneously, India has also given grants-in-aid totalling $4.17 billion to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, bearing true to its Panchsheel philosophy of non-reciprocity.
Similarly, India’s success in regional cooperation has been evident through its multilateral efforts in each grouping: the QUAD’s efforts in countering Chinese assertiveness alongside the US, BIMSTEC’s economic and connectivity projects amongst the countries of the Bay of Bengal, the IORA’s wide range of cooperation in blue economy and disaster management and the ASEAN’s role in taking forward India’s Act East Policy. All these developments have become a reality under SAGAR’s umbrella vision to increase India’s engagements in the Indo-Pacific.
To celebrate a decade of the SAGAR initiative, Prime Minister Modi has made yet another visit to Mauritius where it all began. His visit not only enhanced the India-Mauritius strategic partnership but also announced the initiative's evolution to a wider vision of MAHASAGAR, i.e. Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, which goes beyond the IOR to include the Global South. From “in the region” to “across regions”, this is the right way forward for India to align its regionalism with its collectivism and broaden the scope of the SAGAR initiative towards achieving leadership of developing countries beyond the Indo-Pacific.
India’s Indo-Pacific Engagements: ASEAN & BIMSTEC
*Shreya Das
It has been a decade since India’s Act East policy – a successor to the Look Policy in the 1990 reoriented India’s ties with Southeast Asia. Subsequently, ASEAN has gained a privileged position in Indian diplomatic efforts since then and has contributed to multi-faceted cooperation in politico-security, economic, and cultural relations. The ASEAN centrality is similarly observed in India’s Indo-Pacific outlook; and individual ASEAN members, such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and Indonesia, have become increasingly important to India’s defence endeavours. The regional grouping has always given priority to maritime security and the need to uphold the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and thus, even if it can be argued that ASEAN may have been dwarfed by newer regional forums such as QUAD and AUKUS in recent years in strengthening the region against Chinese expansionism – it is still deemed integral to maintaining regional stability. India will continue its commitment to ASEAN via the ‘ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership,’ and pursue developmental cooperation via capacity building, economic facilitation via the ASEAN-India FTA, maritime connectivity, innovation and anti-piracy efforts, pandemic and public health cooperation, energy security as well as contribute to MPAC 2025’s vision of sustainable infrastructure and digital innovations.
While trade has always been the cornerstone of India-ASEAN relations, maritime security may take precedence in the context of the Indo-Pacific membership. The Indian Ocean Region and the South China Sea have been primary areas of concern for India and several member-states of ASEAN, and therefore, securing freedom of navigation, lawful use of the sea, maritime commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes through recognised principles of international law in the Indo-Pacific must be strongly backed by both parties for the earliest conclusion of Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The lack of a unified stance within the ASEAN on its maritime strategy has proven to be an Achilles heel, and it is up to India to partner proactively with the regional institution to ensure that the maritime waters are not subject to the coercive control of any one power and maintain the presence of multiple stakeholders in the region. The EAS (East Asian Summit) has proven to be an important forum for strategic dialogue on matters of reginal cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. India has continued to champion the language of rules and norms for a need to curtail expansionism in the region.
Closer to home, BIMSTEC was an ambitious alternative to the now – almost defunct SAARC initiative. However, the recent reimagination of Bay of Bengal as a part of a larger maritime sphere of influence, as well as neighbouring countries’ amiability to Chinese investments in the region – requires a reinvigoration of its trade, technology and infrastructure investment in the sub-regional grouping. While there have been some limited achievements in terms of transport connectivity, technology transfer facility, energy connectivity, counter-terrorism, the FTA negotiations are still stuck in a stalemate, and BIMSTEC has often accused of being a dormant institution like its predecessor in the region. Nonetheless, it recently come to limelight again due to its importance to both India’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policy – and policymakers have now recognised its significance to the India’s Indo-Pacific outlook as well. Therefore, blue economy and maritime connectivity have to be given its due weightage in this intra-regional engagement: investing in coastal connectivity to build coastal economic corridors and trans-shipment hubs for cost & time affective trade flow, e.g., port cities in India’s eastern coast such as Kolkata, Visakhapatnam, Cochin with western coasts of Myanmar and Thailand. The prioritisation of the BIMSTEC Comprehensive Free Trade Area should be the priority of the hour as most member-states of the regional organisation have built closer trade relations with China in recent years: deeper market-driven integration is reliant on both (locally viable) cross border manufacturing hubs and local level border haats to ensure both high-tech industrialisation and sustainable production.
India’s regional engagements under the umbrella of Indo-Pacific therefore have to be read and devised as a convergence of security and developmental growth along the maritime region, to protect critical trading routes and a pushback against BRI’s encroachment in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood. India-ASEAN relations have borne fruit in the security arena due to the induction of India in ARF, EAS and ADMM-Plus. BIMSTEC’s notable achievements have been limited to Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. Institutional limitations within both ASEAN and BIMSTEC therefore necessitates India’s long-term commitment to the region, and remain influential in ASEAN’s future maritime strategies and BIMSTEC’s underdeveloped economic development framework.
Economic and Security Challenges Posed by China to India in the Indo-Pacific
*Shaoni Guha Mazumder
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a strategically important area and a centre of geopolitical tension in recent years. It accounts for 63 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), and more than 60 percent of the world's maritime trade flows through the region. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific region serves as a crucial region for an emerging country like India. However, China’s rise as an economic, political, military, and technological powerhouse poses a significant challenge for India. These challenges span both economic and security dimensions and have profound implications for India’s role in the region and its broader global aspirations.
The strategic rivalries in the region today revolve around maintaining military and strategic dominance near crucial chokepoints along SLOCs, where nations jostle to safeguard or deny others free navigation. China has been trying to extend its influence across the region to achieve economic dominance through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI aims to construct infrastructure projects, including railways, highways, ports, and energy pipelines, connecting China to countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Through this initiative, China aims to establish control over maritime routes and expand its economic footprint in the region. Beijing has also sought to use ports in Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Such economic and infrastructural linkages instil fear that India might be sidelined in favour of Chinese interests. For instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through disputed Kashmir, not only undermines India’s territorial integrity but also gives China a strategic economic foothold in neighbouring countries.
Further, Beijing has strengthened its economic ties with the Indo-Pacific nations. Countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan run a trade surplus against China, while India and Singapore run a trade deficit. Thus, China’s increasing trade dominance in the region presents significant economic challenges for India. Additionally, China’s dominance in manufacturing, technology, infrastructure, and access to rare earth minerals gives it a substantial advantage in the region, limiting India’s ability to secure a greater share of regional economic opportunities. India expected cooperation from the U.S in terms of creating an alternative to the Chinese exporting hub. Trump’s decision to set reciprocal tariffs on Indian goods presents a challenge. Faced with the possibility of US tariffs disrupting Indian exports, the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry is encouraging domestic businesses to find ways to replace imports from China and other nations with products from the United States, as reported by industry insiders. This may once again increase economic dependence on China. China's substantial economic strength and military power allow it to implement the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In contrast, India faces limitations due to its economic and geopolitical circumstances, hindering its ability to effectively carry out its infrastructure-focused diplomatic efforts. This disparity creates significant economic and security risks for India.
The security challenges from China pose equally significant threats to India. Both countries share a history of border disputes centred around the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In addition to this, in recent years, China’s “string of pearls” strategy has been perceived as a significant threat to India. While China has refuted this idea of encirclement, its expansion of influence through maritime BRI has urged India and several Western capitals to take this strategic tactic seriously. Beijing has attempted to exploit ports in Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as well as made investments in infrastructure projects. Although China may be using these ports for commercial reasons, New Delhi is concerned about the potential for military usage. Additionally, beyond South Asia, Beijing would be able to contest the Indian Navy's unquestioned supremacy in the Bay of Bengal by participating in the construction of the Kyaukpyu Port in Myanmar. The construction of a Chinese military facility in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa in 2017 and the potential militarisation of Pakistan's Gwadar Port are further concerns for New Delhi.
China’s aggressive policies in the South China Sea, coupled with its military partnerships in the region, pose a direct challenge to India’s strategic interests in maintaining maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Also, its increasing military presence in the neighbouring countries, through joint exercises, arms sales, and infrastructure projects, threatens India’s security interests. India is making great efforts to close the significant gap between its naval capabilities and those of China, but there are several obstacles in the way. For instance, India’s maritime fleet has only 132 warships, while China has 370 warships, a number expected to rise to 435 by 2030. Beijing’s new Type 096 nuclear-armed submarines are extremely hard to detect, posing an additional challenge not just for India but also for the U.S. and its allies, which are closely monitoring China’s naval movements and capabilities.
The economic and security challenges posed by China to India in the Indo-Pacific are multidimensional and interlinked. While India continues to build strategic partnerships with countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia through platforms like the Quad, the competition with China remains fierce. The region’s future stability depends on how India manages these challenges—both in terms of securing its economic interests and safeguarding its security in the face of an assertive and rapidly growing China. The evolving dynamics in the Indo-Pacific will likely shape the geopolitical trajectory of both nations for years to come.
Navigating Territorial Disputes in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
*Prasangana Paul
The Indo-Pacific is not a geography but a living and contested space where economic interests, strategic imperatives, and historical claims converge. Border conflicts in this area—from the South China Sea to the India-China border-are not simply lines on maps. They have profound human costs and touch the lives of millions who rely on these seas and shores for their well-being, security, and sense of self.
At the centre of this shifting geopolitical map is India. Being a regional power with historical interests, economic interests, and security interests, India is both directly and indirectly involved in these conflicts. From answering Chinese belligerence at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), protecting maritime lanes, or conversing with ASEAN and Quad partners, India's position is anything but passive. It is a country that has to walk a tightrope between diplomacy and deterrence, cooperation and confrontation. But beyond military strategies and policy papers, the real impact of these disputes is felt by people—fishermen caught in contested waters, traders whose supply chains are disrupted, and families displaced by cross-border tensions. This human dimension makes India’s role even more significant, as its actions shape not just the strategic map but also the everyday lives of those caught in the middle.
India's most immediate border dispute with China concerns the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by Beijing as part of Tibet Autonomous Region. The dispute traces its origins back to colonial-era treaties, notably the 1914 McMahon Line, which has never been accepted by China. Beijing has pursued a combination of diplomatic, map-based, and military strategies in the decades since to consolidate its claims, which has resulted in periodic tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
In April 2023, China's Ministry of Civil Affairs officially changed the names of 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, after similar name-changing efforts in 2017 and 2021. The action, which is part of the overall strategy by Beijing to "salami slice," aims to gradually change the status quo by making border claims increasingly legitimate over time. On the ground, China has been increasing infrastructure construction such as roads, villages, and military bases along the LAC, testing India's border security. India has responded by increasing its infrastructure initiatives, with programs such as the Vibrant Villages Program to build up border communities and solidify its presence. Nevertheless, the Arunachal conflict is a multifaceted challenge that demands ongoing vigilance, diplomatic action, and military preparedness.
Although India is not a direct claimant in the South China Sea (SCS), the area is of vital strategic and economic importance to New Delhi. The SCS is an important maritime trade route, with approximately 55% of India's trade traversing these waters. The area is also endowed with natural resources, and any instability or conflict would jeopardize global supply chains.
China's assertion of control over almost the whole of SCS on the basis of its disputed nine-dash line has been the root of regional tensions. Notwithstanding a 2016 decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague declaring China's claims to be invalid, Beijing has continued militarizing the waters by building artificial islands and positioning naval equipment. Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have all been at the receiving end of China's use of coercive measures, ranging from naval blockade to disruptions in resource exploration. For India, the freedom of navigation in the SCS is the topmost priority. India has stepped up its interaction with ASEAN member states and engaged in bilateral maritime exercises with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia to enhance maritime security in the region
The Indo-Pacific’s territorial disputes present both challenges and opportunities for India. While Arunachal Pradesh remains a critical front in countering China’s expansionism, India must also safeguard its maritime interests in the South China Sea and navigate the complexities of the Taiwan Strait. India’s role as a responsible and assertive power will be crucial in shaping a free, open, and rules-based order.
India’s Act East Policy
*Rohit Kumar Paswan
On March 13th, in Manila, Philippines, Jaideep Mazumdar, Secretary (East) at the Ministry of External Affairs of India, stated during the 27th ASEAN-India Senior Officials' Meeting, "ASEAN is a crucial pillar of India's Act East Policy and its vision for the Indo-Pacific." This statement underscores the continued importance of the Act East Policy, even after more than a decade.
India's Act East Policy, launched in 2014, is a strategic initiative to strengthen ties with Indo-Pacific countries. Evolving from the earlier Look East Policy, it expands focus to include political, security, and strategic aspects. This policy aims to enhance relations with East Asian and Southeast Asian nations, acknowledging their rising significance in global trade and regional security. It emphasizes multilateral cooperation, regional connectivity, and the key role of ASEAN in promoting economic growth and stability.
As of now, India's Act East Policy has evolved to include robust economic partnerships, cultural exchanges, defense collaborations, and infrastructure development projects with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN members. Key initiatives under the policy include: stronger economic ties with Southeast Asia, strengthen connectivity, enhance security cooperation, and increase cultural diplomacy.
One of the main challenges is China's increasing influence in the region, particularly in trade. Currently, China's trade with ASEAN nations totals $468.8 billion, while India's trade with these countries amounts to only $131.5 billion. To counter China's economic dominance, India needs to enhance its economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific by expanding the scope of its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to include various sectors. Additionally, India should increase its investment in areas such as consumer electronics, green energy, and manufacturing to effectively counter and replace China's influence. The growing anti-India sentiment in certain states like Bangladesh is delaying the infra-projects and expanding the footprint of China in the region.
The changes in the defense landscape provide both challenges and opportunities. A significant development has been India's shift from being primarily a defense mediator and refurbishment center to emerging as a defense exporter. This transition, particularly evident under the AEP, has notably impacted Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and Vietnam, enhancing their defense capabilities and cooperation with India.
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea highlight the necessity for a unified approach among stakeholders to address challenges posed by China. This context underscores the importance of developing a coherent regional strategy that aligns India's interests with those of its partners, fostering collaboration and effectiveness in addressing these critical issues.
The Act East Policy demonstrates India’s commitment to establishing itself as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region. It aims to promote economic growth, enhance security, and build strong, lasting partnerships. This policy has positioned India as a proactive and engaged participant in the Indo-Pacific, fostering regional stability and promoting alternative opportunities. The ongoing developments in this policy are likely to significantly shape India’s role on the global stage in the years to come.
India's Dual Perspective on the Quad Partnership
*Sujal Shah
The Quad exists as a vital strategic arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region after uniting India with the United States and Japan and Australia. As a member of the Quad grouping, India faces multiple diplomatic dilemmas through which substantial opportunities emerge although they need strategic navigation to overcome various challenges. Recent years have brought dramatic changes to Indian foreign policy particularly since India faced border confrontations with China. These strategic changes include the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) in 2015 alongside the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) in 2018 which support the overall objectives of the Quad.
Through the Quad membership, India receives enhanced security partnerships through ongoing cooperative military drills like Malabar and AUSINDEX besides JIMEX. Military strength increases when India enters into intelligence-sharing agreements combined with better interoperability among the militaries. Through strategic bilateral agreements with the United States that include GSOMIA, LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA, India enhances its military capabilities especially in maritime areas where it plans to increase its regional power.
The most important advantage of the Quad arrangement gives India a strategic capability to fight against China's rising influence across the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad vision enables India to manage Chinese Belt and Road Initiative activities in nearby countries thus protecting India from feeling militarily surrounded in the region. By being part of the Quad partnership, India commits to collaborative efforts to preserve maritime access routes in contested sea sectors as well as unified diplomatic approaches against border intrusions.
Through its Quad membership, India will obtain substantial economic benefits. The grouping makes India an attractive investment hub for the contemporary global economic system and allows joint participation in supply chain resilience efforts with Australia and Japan. The creation of infrastructure alternatives including the Blue Dot Network enables India to foster technological partnerships primarily in 5G and digital infrastructure fields. Through the Quadrilateral platform, India expands its pharmaceutical operations as well as vaccine diplomacy by working with partners to distribute a billion vaccine doses to the Indo-Pacific region.
Through the Quad India, boosts its position in world affairs to rise above middle-power status and establishes influence which extends throughout the Indo-Pacific region and reaches beyond. Through this policy, India enhances its global stature following the pandemic to lead recovery efforts and foster strong ties with democratic nations that follow the extended neighbourhood and Act East national strategies. Through frequent summit-level engagements, India establishes its dominant role in developing the regional security structure.
However, the Indian involvement within the Quad faces various difficulties. The challenge facing India involves achieving a suitable equilibrium between its relations with China and border management while participating in the Quad grouping along with simultaneous memberships in BRICS and SCO. India encounters tremendous diplomatic hurdles in keeping Chinese economic relations intact while working to limit China's regional leadership position since it stands alone among Quad members with direct border threats from China.
The Quad also faces difficulties which stem from uniting divergent national interests throughout its membership base. India needs to delve between its conventional diplomatic independence and stronger partnership commitments while handling Quad member states' divergent perspectives toward China. India needs precise diplomatic skills to integrate specific regional issues with non-alignment traditions during its security partnership with other Quad members. The combination of internal requirements and nearby regional limitations makes it more difficult for India to maintain its position. The country needs to resolve its problems in delivering regional infrastructure initiatives because it faces growing competition from Chinese BRI developments in neighbouring areas. India needs to approach its relationships with important partners like Iran and Myanmar strategically while dealing with financial limitations to participate fully in Quad initiatives and balancing national and international obligations.
Strategic risk management presents a major obstacle in itself. The Indian government needs to exercise caution in managing Chinese border aggression which could arise because of Quad membership. The future success of India in its vicinity hinges on two aspects: the management between aggressive behaviour and avoiding intensification along with its diplomatic relations in nations positioned between China and the Quad.
Despite these challenges, recent developments indicate growing cohesion within the Quad, as evidenced by joint vaccine diplomacy initiatives, shared technology development that challenges China's "digital Sinosphere," coordinated bans on Chinese technology providers, and infrastructure development partnerships. As China's assertive actions continue to reshape regional dynamics, India's central role in galvanizing an international response highlights its growing importance on the world stage. The path forward requires strategic vision, careful balancing of competing priorities, and a clear-eyed assessment of both the opportunities and risks that the Quad grouping presents for India's position in the evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture.
India’s Security and Defence Engagements in the Indo-Pacific
*Adrien Benito
India's strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region makes it a crucial player in regional security and geopolitical stability. India has sought to navigate the complex rivalry between the USA and China, always favoring a nuanced approach that safeguards its own interests. The aim of the hedging strategy is to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy in the face of the upheavals occurring in the region. To this end, India aims to strengthen its security and defence commitments through military modernization, strategic alliances and, more generally, proactive engagement in the Indo-Pacific, making it a key player.
India has been proactive in building defence and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region through alliances and diplomacy. In 2018, at the Shangri La Dialogue, Narendra Modi presented India's vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific to counter China's growing influence and threat. This definitely marks India's deeper commitment to collaboration with other players such as Japan, Australia and the USA within the QUAD framework. India is also developing its maritime security cooperation with ASEAN countries, as well as with France and Japan in the field of defence and security.
India faces the challenge of maintaining a fine balance in its strategic security partnerships with all its partners, which are mainly the USA, Russia, the ASEAN countries, Japan and the EU. The outbreak of war in Ukraine by Russia in 2022 makes this position difficult to maintain, given India's economic and defence ties with Russia. As a result, India's military and security relations with Russia have evolved considerably since the outbreak of war.
To prepare against external threats, India has stepped up its commitments in the Indo-Pacific region by expanding its military arsenal. Two trends clearly emerge from India's armaments policy. Firstly, imports have tended to decline over the years, falling by 9.3 per cent over the period 2020-2024 compared with 2015-2019. Secondly, Russia's share of total arms imports has fallen considerably: it was 72% between 2010 and 2014, 55% between 2015 and 2019, and 36% between 2019 and 2023. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, deliveries of the S-400 Triumph missile have continued as planned under the contract signed in 2018. Only one new contract was signed with Russia, worth $248 million, for tank engines. This reorientation strongly benefits France, which has concluded negotiations for the acquisition of 26 Rafales for around $7.6 billion, with the formal signature scheduled for April 2025 during the French Defence Minister's visit to India. This announcement follows the 36 Rafales already delivered in 2022. It also benefits the United States: since 2008, India has agreed to purchase around $20 billion worth of American defence equipment. Last year, they signed a deal for 31 MQ-9B Sea Guardian and Sky Guardian UAVs. The new Trump administration has said these deals could go further with the sale of the F-35 fighter jet. But Russia is also proposing to sell fighter jets to India, which are cheaper and less restrictive in use. Compared with American defence equipment, Russian (and to a certain extent French) equipment allows for more technology transfer. As this is a priority for the Indian government, this may favour Russian equipment over Western equipment, and it also enables them to continue diversifying their partners.
In the long term, India's strategy is to produce the military equipment it needs itself. In 2014, Narendra Modi launched the “Make in India” or “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative. The aim is to develop their own production and increase their exports. In this respect, the sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines marks a first step in India's defence export diplomacy. The Philippines received its first batch of BrahMos missiles in April 2024 under a $375 million agreement signed in 2022. This policy of indigenous production is achievable thanks to long-term investment plans in the sector and technology transfers from its partners, but for the time being, given the tense geopolitical environment, India still relies on imports for its defence.
At the same time, India is strengthening its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region through joint military exercises. One of India's main commitments is the Malabar exercise, which has been taking place since 1992. Initially conducted bilaterally with the USA, the annual exercise was later joined by Japan and Australia as part of the Quadrilateral. The exercise focuses on naval security and maritime domain awareness to uphold the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Another cornerstone of India's recognition as a naval power and provider of regional maritime security is the organization of the multilateral naval exercise MILAN, which brings together up to 50 countries every two years to promote greater maritime security. India also participates in other multinational maritime safety training programs, such as the La Perouse event, which brings together 9 countries. On a bilateral level, France and India take part in numerous land (SAHKITI), air (GARUDA) and sea (VARUNA) exercises. Last January, in the run-up to the 42nd edition of VARUNA, the entire Groupe Aéronaval (GAN) carried out several cooperative actions with the Indian navy.
On a bilateral level, India has also been participating in military exercises with Russia since 2003 with INDRA. These manoeuvres also focus on interoperability and coordination between the two nations' armed forces, with land and naval exercises. In September 2022, India will take part in the Vostok exercise organized by Russia in the Russian Far East, together with Chinese forces. In November 2023, Russia and India also conducted joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, strengthening naval cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. All these joint exercises are aimed at improving military interoperability and strengthening strategic cooperation.
India's security and defence commitments in the Indo-Pacific region are a key pillar of its strategic vision. By increasing its purchases of defence equipment, engaging in joint military exercises and deepening its regional partnerships, India is positioning itself as a major security provider in the region. The diversity of its partners enables it to pursue its policy of autonomy and non-alignment with the United States, while continuing to develop a strong relationship with Western countries that appears to be deepening over time.
*The Authors are currently Research Interns at the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS).
About the Authors:
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