By Akanshya Ray
Published on December 3, 2024
By late October 2024, pro-democracy resistance fighters in Myanmar had advanced within a few kilometres of Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city. This marked a significant shift in the civil war, which had mostly been focused in ethnic areas until then. For decades, Myanmar has faced a brutal conflict between its military junta and rebel groups, which, since the 2021 coup, have gained ground nationwide, challenging the regime’s dominance. The revolution did not begin as an armed insurgency but started with peaceful protests against the military coup that destabilized Myanmar after a decade of relative calm. However, a bloody crackdown forced protesters into the jungles, where they joined ethnic militias that have long waged wars for autonomy. While these factions are united in their opposition to military rule, what will happen if and when they succeed?
If Myanmar’s armed rebels were to oust the junta, the future could be far from simple. Each group carries its own vision for Myanmar’s future, ideas that are shaped by deep ethnic and ideological divides. As calls for autonomy, independence, and federal governance collide, Myanmar could face a new kind of conflict if these competing goals cannot be reconciled. Hence it is crucial to explore the potential outcomes of a successful rebellion, inquiring whether Myanmar’s diverse armed groups have a common peaceful future or if their divergent ambitions could lead to a fractured post-military Myanmar.
Who are the Rebels?
Myanmar’s history of armed resistance includes several ethnic minorities (officially 135 groups, as per the British census of 1931) and coalition of groups. Among the most prominent players are the Karen National Union (KNU), Arakan Army (AA), and Kachin Independence Army (KIA), ethnic militias with aspirations for autonomy within their respective regions.
After Aung San Suu Kyi was imprisoned following the 2021 military coup, her party members formed a parallel government in exile to challenge the military dictatorship - the National Unity Government (NUG). Alongside traditional ethnic militias, a new generation of resistance has emerged. The People’s Defence Force (PDF), the NUG’s shadow army in exile, is broadly a pro-democracy group that transcends ethnic lines. The PDF predominantly draws support from the Bamars (Burman), Myanmar’s largest ethnic group.
Thousands of young civilians joined the PDF to fight against the junta’s atrocities creating some sort of a Gen Z guerrilla force. Over 60,000 civilians, including students, engineers, teachers, artists, mechanics, and bankers, have come together, putting their knowledge and skills at the service of the resistance. A former mechanic, now building weapons and bombs for the PDF, asserts, “The junta lacks one crucial thing - determination. That’s something we have, and that’s why we will win.”
1027 and Current Operations
In recent months, the junta has been retreating in the face of sustained assaults by the PDF, which has now allied with ethnic armed organizations (EAO), creating a formidable opposition. Operation 1027, one of the most intense offensives against the ruling military, is an ongoing coordinated campaign involving three ethnic rebel groups - the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The “Brotherhood Alliance” has captured strategically significant border towns with control over areas in Shan, Karen, and Chin states, and now hold key border crossings with China, Thailand, and India.
On October 30, 2023, the NUG issued a statement recognizing the MNDAA, AA, and TNLA as ethnic revolutionary organizations and joined their offensive.
In southern Myanmar, the PDF has joined forces with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the country’s oldest ethnic guerilla force, creating an alliance that has transformed the conflict. For several weeks, the PDF and its allies have controlled parts of the AH1- the longest road in Asia, connecting China to Turkey through Myanmar. This route generates millions in revenue for the junta, making its capture a significant strategic and tactical victory that weakens the regime’s resources.
Jason Tower from the U.S. Institute of Peace remarks that the Myanmar army now faces an existential threat. But most importantly, while the NUG seeks to end military rule, the Brotherhood Alliance demands autonomy for their ethnic regions. Only if the NUG can promise a federated structure in a post-military Myanmar, it may gain the ethnic group’s full support. Despite these advances, the Myanmar army remains a well-equipped force with air power and artillery to inflict unimaginable damage and retain control over the central Bamar heartland.
Divergent Goals and Post-Military Plans
Despite solidarity between the different ethnic groups, common enemy does not translate to common aspirations. As rebel groups inch closer to weakening the military’s grip, the question remains whether these factions can set aside their differences for the sake of a unified and peaceful Myanmar, or if their divergent ambitions will escalate into a new cycle of conflict.
Each group has a different vision for the future of Myanmar - a division that could set the stage for conflict if the military were to be removed from power. For example, the fundamental goal of MNDAA is to unequivocally restore its control over Kokang. The Karen National Union (KNU) envisions a federal Myanmar where ethnic regions enjoy a high degree of autonomy, allowing the Karen people to govern themselves within a broader democratic structure. In contrast, AA aims to create an “Arakan Nation” in Rakhine State, while the TNLA fights for “real federation” in Myanmar. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is primarily focused on achieving substantive autonomy for the Kachin people.
Amongst all these, the PDF is pushing for a nationwide democratic transition that emphasizes unity across ethnic lines. The PDF’s pro-democracy stance aims to build a Myanmar in which ethnic divisions are minimized in favour of a unified, civilian-led government. However, this goal may clash with ethnic militias who prioritize local autonomy over national unity. Without a shared post-military vision, these groups will find themselves in opposition, further destabilizing the political environment.
Probable Outcomes
Below are some probable scenarios illustrating how Myanmar’s political landscape might evolve if the armed groups succeed in toppling the junta.
In the most optimistic outcome, Myanmar’s rebel groups come together to establish a federal framework that respects ethnic autonomy while maintaining national unity. This solution would see Myanmar transformed into a democratic federal union while The PDF and NUG could play a critical role in mediating and coordinating these efforts among diverse factions.
In a less favourable scenario, the diverse ambitions of Myanmar’s rebel groups lead to fragmentation. As each faction pursues its vision, disputes over governance, resource distribution, and territorial boundaries could ignite. Groups with conflicting goals, like the Arakan Army’s push for full independence versus the PDF’s vision of a federal union, may find themselves at odds, further destabilizing the country.
Another potential outcome is the emergence of power vacuums. As the junta retreats, some areas might be left without stable governance, creating opportunities for local factions to assert control. These power vacuums could potentially invite foreign intervention or influence from neighbouring countries with vested interests and increase the risk of proxy conflicts.
Regional Implications and the Role of International Actors
India’s stance closely aligns with the Act East Policy, in which Myanmar is a vital land bridge to ASEAN nations, making its stability critical to India’s bilateral and regional interests. Challenges such as cross-border militancy, illegal trafficking of arms and narcotics, and refugee influxes compel India to maintain working relations with the junta while advocating for a return to democracy, as emphasized by India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar during the recent talks with Myanmar’s Foreign Minister U Than Shwe, on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC foreign ministers’ retreat. India also continues to invest in regional connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to strengthen trade and socio-economic ties.
On November 7, 2024, Myanmar’s junta leader, Min Aung Hlaing, held talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang on the ongoing civil war. This was Hlaing’s first visit to China since he took power in the 2021 coup. Beijing has historically maintained relationships with both the Myanmar military and some ethnic armed groups (such as MNDAA) to protect its interests. In a post-military scenario, China may seek to support factions that align with its objectives, potentially using its economic and diplomatic leverage to shape Myanmar’s internal politics.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has struggled to mediate Myanmar’s crisis, hindered by its policy of non-interference. However, if Myanmar’s internal divisions deepen, ASEAN may feel compelled to take a more active role, especially to protect regional security.
Additionally, the United States and the European Union have imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s military regime. Under Biden administration, the U.S. response to the Myanmar conflict was cautious and limited. While it condemned the coup and offered some humanitarian assistance, its approach largely relied on ASEAN to address the crisis. With the establishment of the first-ever Burma Caucus in 2024 and the passage of the BURMA Act in 2022, U.S. involvement remains modest, with minimal support for the NUG and EAOs.
As Donald Trump is re-elected, America could take a less interventionist approach, potentially favouring direct negotiations with the junta while scaling back sanctions and humanitarian aid. However, this may leave room for China to strengthen its influence in Myanmar. It remains uncertain whether Myanmar will feature in Trump’s strategic calculations in the broader U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry or continue to be overlooked.
Conclusion
As Myanmar enters the fifth year of this brutal civil war, the armed resistance stands at critical crossroads. While the challenge of negotiating and reconciling differences is formidable, the shared desire to end decades of military oppression offers a powerful incentive for compromise and cooperation. Yet, whether this incentive is strong enough to sustain unity remains uncertain. The current reality reflects that the international community is not stepping in to take responsibility for Myanmar. To the West, Myanmar appears to be a lost cause, and the East is reluctant to get involved. The burden of achieving peace rests solely on the people of Myanmar.
Myanmar, historically a loose federation of tribal states united only by Buddhism, now finds its youth bound by a shared experience of war induced trauma and collective hope for a new future. Whether a unified national identity will rise from these ashes remains an open question in Myanmar’s future.
* The Author is currently a Research Intern at the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS). She is also currently pursuing her Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Peacebuilding at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia.
Disclaimer: The Views in the Article are those of the Author
Photo: The Kokang online media via AP
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