By Asha Thrisali Lanka
Published on Aug 29, 2025
With the emergence of a multipolar world system, the concept of “Minilateralism”, which is a smaller-scale collaboration among a select group of states, has emerged as a significant and prominent tool to pursue one goal or resolve issues through the commitment of shared values. US-India minilateral engagement, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), in the Indo-Pacific region has drawn significant attention from China since it directly challenges China’s ambitions for maritime dominance. In response, China has employed asymmetric coercion – a mix of economic trap, diplomatic fragmentation, and military engagements to undermine the effectiveness of these minilateral coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, revealing China's core concerns to reshape the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape, and growing China’s regional influence.
The Indo-Pacific region, which serves as a powerhouse of the global economy, creates high tension among global powers. Among them, China has utilized its geostrategic responses in the Indo-Pacific region as its foreign policy initiative to counter the challenges that emerge from the multilateral engagements between the US and India. It is vital to focus on the US and India’s strategies for establishing minilateral cooperations in the Indo-Pacific region, to see how it will be a challenge to China and how China counters those responses.
Analyzing US engagement in establishing minilateral cooperations significantly shows that most of the US allies have cooperated with the US for strengthening their security ties, which are directly deterring China’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region. As an example, the alliance with Japan is significant for the US to represent its power projection in the region, deterring China’s strategies toward Taiwan. Further, the US-Korea alliance's approach to counter China’s response to Taiwan, growing its military ties and naval capabilities, is a key aspect of US-Korea relations. The USA’s minilateral approaches are witnessed in the infrastructure investments between the US and Australia. These infrastructure investments can further support the defence operation in Taiwan, countering China’s presence in Taiwan. These relations further strengthen the minilateral approaches of the US, such as AUKUS. This AUKUS arrangement is the most high-profile recent manifestation of the minilaterlalism. Accordingly, it significantly reflects that US grand strategies to the Indo-Pacific region, strengthening its minilateral engagement through economic initiatives, development of military capabilities and infrastructure facilities development pivot to counter China’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region. From a Chinese perspective, it is further argued that the US attempts are witnessing the emergence of a new cold war.
With the emergence of India’s minilateralist engagement in the Indian Ocean, China seeks to break the coalitions within minilateral initiatives such as QUAD, AUKUS and other groupings, emphasizing India’s historical non-alignment policies, economic asymmetries among members. However, despite these efforts, India increased its deep engagement with minilateral frameworks, shifting its presence towards strategic pragmatism in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s geostrategic centrality in the Indian Ocean and the US’s naval expansion, establishing military bases further, can reshape regional power balances, increasing regional anxiety of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, A strategic partnership with the USA through the QUAD platform enhances India’s military security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and it allows India to reflect shared values such as democracy and maintenance of law and order. India further stresses that QUAD is not a military alliance. Still, it focuses on growing its maritime security, supply chain resilience, and technological and infrastructure advancements, making minilateralism a vital platform to balance power strategies in the Indo-Pacific region. India has strengthened its trilateral platforms with France, Australia, the UAE, and the US to emphasise maritime cooperation, infrastructure standards, and energy and technological investments. India also actively engages with ASEAN and Indian Ocean Island nations through its “Act East” and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrines, proving its role as a security facilitator and counterbalancing China’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, India’s action towards minilateralism reduces dependence on Chinese manufacturing and enhances regional economic security. In conclusion, these minilateral strategies can be identified as instruments of strategic balancing among global powers, creating space for India to counter China’s rise.
To counter the minilateral engagement of the US and India, China has utilized its strategic responses as a main foreign policy concern. In its diplomatic policy choices, China always strategizes to connect with the Global South countries to establish its main value, “building a community of shared future for humankind”. Accordingly, China attaches great importance to strengthening solidarity and cooperation with countries of the Global South through its infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From a Chinese perspective, it is mentioned that China utilized its maritime strategies through a defensive national defence policy, adhered to the path of peaceful development, advocated and practised the Global Security Initiative, and has been a persistent force in maintaining world peace. Further, it can be identified that China has utilised its Multi-faceted Counterstrategy on different platforms. As mentioned above, China has widened its institutional expansion through BRI and AIIB, and has focused on ASEAN, focusing on strengthening its connections with Vietnam, Philippines and ASEAN security cooperation in countering the US and India’s minilateral presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It further shows that China has focused on strategic hedging, reinforcing connections with Russia and Iran to balance US pressure. It is further significantly acknowledged that China combines assertive economic influence with political-psychological tactics such as media campaigns, sovereignty narratives, and overseas propaganda to shape regional position, countering the minilateralist engagement of the US and India.
In conclusion, China’s response to US–India minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific can be identified as multifaceted and increasingly assertive. The competition between minilateralism and counter-minilateralism shows a reflective shift in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical arena. It can be further found that the Indo-Pacific region has become a chessboard where global powers are competing with each other, with one anchored in open, rule-based alliances led by the US and its partners, and the other is driven by China’s state-centric development-first archetype. Therefore, it is vital to assess the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region at a broader level of understanding, focusing on new dimensions of state alliances such as minilateralism.
*Asha Thrishali Lanka is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Auckland. She also served as an intern at KIIPS from May to July 2025.