Roundtable on “Indo-Pacific Strategic Churn: Challenges and State Responses”

Event Overview and Core Themes

The Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS) convened a roundtable and book launch in New Delhi to address the rapidly evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Held on November 15, 2025, at the India International Centre, the event brought together distinguished scholars and policymakers to deliberate on the region's transitory geopolitical phase. The session, chaired by Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, featured the launch of the volume “Indo-Pacific Strategic Churn: Challenges & State Responses,” with keynotes from Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia and Shri Shishir Priyadarshi, President, Chintan Foundation.

The discussions highlighted that the global international system is currently in a state of "Brownian motion"—non-linear and unsettled—marked by a declining US-led order and an uncrystallised new order. Participants noted that while the US-China rivalry remains the structural driver of regional geopolitics, the landscape is being reshaped by leadership and capability deficits among major powers, as well as the emergence of "geopolitical spaces" filled by shifting alliances. For India, the primary imperative is navigating this turbulence by recalibrating frameworks, doubling down on functional cooperation, and managing the delicate balance between American retrenchment and Chinese assertiveness.

Detailed Strategic Insights

1. The Geopolitical Context: A Region in Transition

• The global geopolitical context is changing rapidly, and existing analytical frameworks are not evolving fast enough to interpret these shifts.
• The international system is in a transitory phase between a declining US-led order and an uncrystallised new order, creating uncertainty and strategic turbulence.
• Multiple simultaneous developments: Russia-Ukraine war, West Asian instability, fractures within the transatlantic alliance, shifting alignments in Asia, and competition over supply chains and critical minerals, are reshaping strategic calculations.
• The Indo-Pacific must be understood through the concept of “geopolitical spaces” that emerge due to leadership deficits (e.g., inconsistent US commitment), capability deficits (e.g., America’s reduced ability to deploy power), and intent deficits among major powers.
• These spaces are also shaped by external geopolitical forces outside the region and internal metamorphosis within states, particularly China’s growing ambition and capability.
• The geopolitical context is changing rapidly with regional crises, technological transition, weaponization of tariffs, and ambiguous great power ties.
• The Indo-pacific region should be open and inclusive and must have a rule-based architecture.
• 2. Great Power Dynamics: The US and China
• USA currently stands as the dominant player in the Indo-pacific, but its legitimacy depends on two important factors: How the US would effectively mobilise the other countries in the region, and how it will deal with the China factor.
• US foreign policy under Trump displayed visible disruptions, yet deeper structural continuities persisted beneath the surface, reflecting the “iceberg” nature of American strategic behaviour.
• The US approach to the Indo-Pacific must be understood temporally, that is, pre-Trump, Trump, Biden as an interregnum, and a potential post-Trump phase, each carrying different implications for regional order and stability.
• As the Trump second administration reframes security and economic ties in the Indo-Pacific region irrespective of allies and adversaries, the power vacuum in the region is turning more uncertain and ambiguous.
• The undercurrents of US foreign policy are beyond Trump and Trumpism.
• U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific shows diverging trends; economic commitments are hollowed out: BDN, IPEF, and U.S. infrastructure investments reveal diminishing American willingness to put financial resources into the region.
• Alliance politics, burden sharing, trade frictions, and Washington’s internal anxiety complicate US strategic presence, while America’s limited attention bandwidth forces it to prioritize among global commitments.
• China acts as an impediment to stability in the Indo-Pacific region primarily through aggressive territorial claims, rapid military modernization and assertiveness, and the use of economic coercion and “debt-trap” diplomacy.
• A core question is whether China possesses both the intent and the resources to fill the emerging strategic vacuums in the Indo-Pacific.
• As US engagement retracts in certain areas (e.g., USAID pull-outs), China advances through initiatives like the Global Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative, incrementally filling geopolitical vacuums.
• Even as the US retracts its footprints as a development partner in the region, it is not clear how China is going to fill up the gaps.
• US–China rivalry is the defining structural driver of Indo-Pacific geopolitics; the nature of their interaction, confrontation, competition, accommodation, or oscillation — will heavily shape regional order.
• 3. India’s Strategic Imperatives and Rise
• India’s early embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept was shaped by Shinzo Abe’s 2007 “Confluence of the Two Seas” idea and later formalized when Indian policymakers linked it to the evolution of the Look East → Act East policy.
• The Indo-Pacific remains geopolitically crucial to India’s interests and global posture; Indian scholarship seeks to revive and reposition the region as a strategic priority for Indian foreign policy.
• India is increasing its presence in the Indo-pacific and it comes from the fact that 40% of the waters of the Indian Ocean still comes under the ambit of India and it faces a constant disturbance with China.
• India’s legitimacy and presence in the Indo-Pacific region and within the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) countries are rising and can be seen effectively due to its active diplomatic engagement, strategic partnerships, and a policy focused on a rules-based, inclusive, and cooperative regional order.
• For India, the most pressing concern is the strategic choice of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to maximize gains and minimize vulnerabilities amidst a fluid and rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.
• The contemporary world politics resembles Brownian motion: non-linear, unsettled, and unpredictable, making it essential for India to carve out space and safeguard its interests within this turbulence.
• As India, with its relatively limited resources needs partnerships to shape outcomes in the region, the US-China dynamics of accommodation and competition needs to be watched acutely.
• Therefore, India needs to constantly recalibrate the existing frameworks to navigate bilateral and multilateral dynamics.
• The current lows in US-India relationship signifies the importance of doubling down on functional cooperation and not depend on leadership chemistry alone.
• New great-power vectors are emerging as India increasingly enters the great-power domain.
• India’s technological growth, power-projection capability, and strategic outreach are reshaping how other states position themselves.
• Debates within the U.S. (e.g., on immigration) and Japan (over ODA to India) reflect shifting perceptions of India’s rising status.
• As India is moving into the great power domain, it should navigate its relationship with great, middle and smaller powers being mindful of this shift.
• In that light, India’s engagements will be a much more vigorous combination of headwinds and tailwinds.
• The US imposed tariffs is an unwelcome development but there may be a brighter side to view it which is that it may be changing expectations of other powers from India.
• And finally, that poses questions about how India should augment its capacity in the sectors at the helm such as evolution of technology and its application.
• India’s contemporary position is shaped simultaneously by a critical phase in India–China rapprochement and an upcoming high-level India–Russia engagement (Putin’s 2025 visit), both of which may recalibrate regional power equations.
• The Indo-Pacific strategic picture is further complicated by the current strain in US–India ties, the postponement of the Quad summit, and the symbolic weight of reciprocal Trump–Xi state visits planned for 2026.
• 4. Alliances, Frameworks, and Regional Architecture
• The formation of alliances and groupings has also taken the centre stage in the region, and the most prominent example of such alliances is the QUAD.
• Shifting priorities of regional mini-laterals are visible.
• The Quad’s direction remains uncertain despite India’s chair year and mixed signals from Washington.
• Below the Quad, trilaterals (India–Japan–U.S.; India–UAE–France; India–UAE–Sri Lanka) are increasingly central to regional cooperation, particularly in areas like energy.
• A “flattening” of the mini-lateral landscape may occur as states rely less on the Quad as the Indo-Pacific’s core pillar.
• Another significant factor regarding the Indo-pacific is the Indo-pacific Economic Framework which does not comprise the whole of Indo-pacific.
• Among the participants of the economic framework, Southeast Asian countries have the prominence as 7 of the 14 members are the ASEAN countries.
• Russia is a wild card entry in Indo-Pacific region. Though they differ over the terms defining the region, India should continue to pursue engaging Russia in the region.
• India should engage with Russia in maritime military exercises in the region.
• Doing so will help New Delhi in balancing other powers in the region as well as check the wherewithal of Russia in this specific area of the region.
• It will also help open maritime linkages with the Arctic beyond the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor.
• 5. Economic and Defense Trends
• Two of the key challenges that the region face are: Maintaining maritime security and cooperation of the nation states in the economic domain.
• Recently there has been a trend of inflating the defence budget by the Indo-pacific countries such as the USA, Japan, South Korea and Australia, to tackle the rise of China factor in the region.
• Trade dynamics have shifted after recent U.S.–China economic rapprochement and Trump’s rollback of tariffs.
• Expected supply-chain deflections away from China did not materialize, prompting states, including India, to diversify towards Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, Latin America, and Brazil.
• US economic hollowed out commitments creates both opportunities and short-term challenges for other states to fill the gap.
• 6. Security Challenges: Nuclear, Missile, and Maritime
• North Korea remains a major security concern in the Indo-Pacific, despite fewer missile tests in 2025 and reduced U.S. political attention.
• The U.S. administration continues to acknowledge the need for dialogue and diplomacy, confirming the issue’s ongoing relevance.
• Persistent brinkmanship by North Korea remains poorly understood by nuclear scholarship.
• Its unpredictable escalation tactics and signals create uncertainty about thresholds and intentions, further deepening instability.
• The problem is now intensified due to major geopolitical externalities—specifically the renewed strategic engagement of China and Russia.
• Both states have become more supportive of North Korea, calling for easing sanctions in multiple UNSC debates (2021–2024), reversing the earlier U.S.–China–Russia unity of 2017–2021.
• China and Russia’s shifting posture isolates the U.S. within nuclear multilateralism, weakening the effectiveness of sanctions—the last significant diplomatic coercive tool available to the international community.
• In response, the U.S. is doubling down on extended nuclear deterrence.
• Since 2023, several consultations and mechanisms (including the Nuclear Consultative Group) have increased military coordination with South Korea, expanded military drills, and enhanced deployments of strategic bombers, submarines, and nuclear-capable assets.
• The long-term consequences are structurally destabilizing: Erosion of nuclear norms and voluntary restraint practices, weakening of global disarmament momentum across WMD categories, Spillover effects on biological and missile proliferation debates (especially with 2025 marking the 50th year of the Biological Weapons Convention), And broad regional + global security risks as the norm-breaking behaviour entrenches itself.
• A realistic pathway forward is Track 1.5 diplomacy; informal consultations could enable creative, flexible engagement.
• Such a mechanism could start with a small group (U.S.–South Korea–Japan) and gradually expand multilaterally.
• There is a need to keep a watch on DPRK's missile and nuclear developments, owing to its proliferation linkages to the countries in the neighbourhood, especially the Western Front.
• Since Indo-Pacific is already home to several Least Developed Economies (LDE) such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Timor-Leste, and Yemen, the issue of missile proliferation and its linkages to State and Non-State Actors is of utmost importance for the security of the Indo-Pacific as well as for India.
• Finally, the issue of missile proliferation is also linked to the security of the IOR.
• Keeping the IOR free from these maritime threats (offsetting piracy intentions by denying military capabilities) is important for India's maritime grand strategy as we aspire to be recognised as preferred security partners of countries of IOR.
• It is also aligned to MAHASAGAR vision.
• India needs to focus on the growing nuclear conundrum that is building in the Indo-Pacific region.
• With US’ Extended Nuclear Deterrence, the close cooperation between Russia and North Korea and the deteriorating relationship between Russia-US and US-North Korea including the nuclear sabre-rattling, and US-Japan-South Korea cooperation, situation might become unstable.
• 7. Non-Traditional Security, Health, and Soft Power Leadership
• India must focus on narrative building in the region to create a stable and secure Indo-Pacific.
• It has been noticed that while dealing with developing countries, the West uses the term ‘carrot and stick’ policy, an approach that is not going down well for the rest.
• India should prioritise national interests while highlighting the necessity of equitable resource allocation, strengthening international organisations (such as WHO, ASEAN, and QUAD), capacity building, and cross-border data exchange during emergencies such as SARS, H1N1, and COVID-19.
• India should lead the Indo-Pacific region in terms of environmental issues, such as vector-borne illness hazards exacerbated by climate change, which require integrated, ecosystem-based responses.
• India must advocate for coordinated regional action, health diplomacy, and inclusive policy frameworks that are crucial to reducing future risks and establishing resilient, long-term health systems around the world, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
• The Indo-Pacific is a disaster hotspot: Asia (including the Pacific/Indian Ocean rim) experienced the largest share of climate- and weather-related disasters in recent years.
• Sea-originating hazards (tropical cyclones, storm surges, tsunamis) are a defining feature of regional risk and a recurring source of cross-border humanitarian need, which makes transnational cooperation and shared early-warning/response systems essential.
• Amplify middle power partnerships.
• Must build capability to build influence like China’s Peace Ark ambulance. This should have institutional coherence.
• Develop a doctrine in terms of being a “respectful responder” which will differentiate India strategically from western interventionism or Chinese conditionality of aid.
• India needs to build frameworks that outlast individual, reactionary operations and create apolitical mechanisms for shared vulnerabilities.

  ---