The Fragile Chokepoints in West Asia: Connectivity in Crisis

By Roshni Ghosh

Published on August 11, 2025

The two straits in West Asia-- Bab al Mandeb and Hormuz, leverage their geographic locations in being internationally strategic transits for trade and connectivity. The Bab al Mandeb is the bridge between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Hormuz is the only opening from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea and ultimately the Indian Ocean. While the Bab Al Mandab is a necessary link in the chain of the maritime routes crossing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, Hormuz is an essential seaborne passage for oil and gas from the Persian Gulf countries. The recent tensions in the Middle east region, especially with Israel and the U.S. attacks on Iran have complicated the waterways that have international implications.  

So, what makes these chokepoints so significant? The answer is the comparative efficiency of these straits to their alternatives. The Cape of Good Hope, though a sort after option when the Red Sea risks build up, adds to certain disadvantages. It increases shipping costs, travel distances, insurance rates and additional journey charges of time, fuel, and freight rates. In addition, Saudi’s East-West and UAE’s Habshan- Fujairah Pipelines are national resorts for oil trade and cannot match the Hormuz capacity. In essence, these resorts fail to match the economical advantages of Mandeb and Hormuz. However, the territories bordering these straits, owing to their respective regional and political dynamics often weaponize the vital chokepoints to suit their confrontational ambitions.

Glimpse of Regional geopolitics

Bab Al Mandeb encompasses the piracy hotspot on the African coast with piracy threats from Kenya and Somalia who share borders with the Gulf of Aden. The region has presence of major powers like China and the US have naval bases stationed near Djibouti’s coast, making it a flashpoint of a dreaded power competition. Piracy continues to be an important element in Mandeb’s security dynamics since 27 verified Somalian attacks (November 2023- October 2024) and an uptick in similar incidents as latest as early 2025, indicate a resurgence.

Another flashpoint in Bab Al Mandab is the Arabian Peninsula where Yemeni Houthi rebel group supported by Iran has been another protracted element of disturbance. The civil war confined within the Yemeni territory in 2014 has magnified into a wider scope of regional tensions (the Iran- Saudi proxy war) since Saudi’s military intervention (2015) to secure the strait. Late 2023, the Red Sea crisis became a highlight in the headlines since the Houthi retaliation against Israel’s war post the October 7 attacks. The rebel group contributed to escalating the tensions from hijack attempts into a vicious menace, even forcing major shipping groups such as Maersk and BP to reroute.

The current situation has worsened with the Iran-Israel War that has direct impact on 30% seaborne and 20% of global LNG trade that passes through this strait. Not controlled directly by any nation, the security of this strait is heavily influenced by its neighbouring countries and Iran tops that list. In the past 15 years Iran has used the Hormuz blockade threats at least 5 times. Recently Hormuz has yet again come under the radar as Iran’s looming threat in the Iran- Israel contentions has raised concerns for the oil exporting Gulf countries despite the customary right of transit passage.

Connectivity in crisis? What is at stake for India?

Before the Red Sea Crisis, Bab Al Mandeb managed 8.7 million bpd (Persian- Gulf oil) and 1,980 ships per month. Houthi barrages via drones, mines and missiles starting late 2023 which continued for the most part in 2024 severely impacted the transit route. In the first eight months of 2024, oil transport reduced by a drastic 50%. There has been no EIA update on 2025 levels but data indicates a continuity of the 4.2 million bpd average in 2025. Containerised services average dropped from 1,980 ships per month to 971. The shipping volume has stabilised to this average despite a slight relaxation in Houthi attacks as majority are still avoiding the Mandeb route. Hormuz in 2024, shouldered a global average of 20.9 million bpd. In comparison to Mandeb, there has been no dramatic change observed in Hormuz’s average in 2025 Q1. What has been dramatic for Hormuz is Iran’s parliament threatening a closure of this strait and surge in oil prices amidst risk speculations (about 4-5% in Brent crude).

India was hit by the same disadvantages that shook other markets in the rerouting strategy after the Red Sea crisis. India’s margins in sectoral exports such as automotive components and pharmaceuticals, suffered major losses due to increased costs in logistics, war insurance premiums and unpredictable delays via the Cape of Good Hope. To regain balance in export competition India purchased second hand container ships to reduce reliance on foreign vessels and face lower freight rates. The relatively recent Hormuz crisis has created another set of worries for Indian ambitions. Any significant impact on India’s Persian- Gulf oil imports is yet to be confirmed. Apart from oil, India has strategic interests at stake- the Chahbahar port and the INSTC corridor, an alternative to the Suez route for Europe bound shipments and the IMEC megaproject. While Chahbahar has done relatively well (2024-25) in terms of vessel and container traffic, it is an important counter to Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea and a flagbearer of India’s SAGAR vision. India has good relations with Iran as well as Israel, but the recent tensions between the middle east countries throw India into a diplomatic stretch in relation to its IMEC connectivity scheme.

Conclusion

Despite the ceasefire agreement facilitated by the United States, Oman and other countries the maritime traffic has been inching towards the Mandeb- Suez corridor with great caution. Efforts in reviving the route’s utility include 15% transit discounts promised by the Suez Canal Authority. The Egyptian government has also made attempts to encourage further confidence amidst a 58% shrink in traffic compared to April 2023. Amidst uncertainty, multinational patrols such as the EU’s Operation Aspides under the EUNAVFOR and the US Operation Prosperity Guardian are trying to provide a secure transit passage for the commercial vessels. In summary, the global trade market is still recuperating from the Red Sea crisis. As for the Iran- Israel tensions, truth to be told its highly unlikely for Iran to block the strait singlehandedly without facing bigger geopolitical repercussions from the consumers. It can disrupt the traffic as it has done before using mines and drone attacks and the recent GPS jamming tactics, but it also depends on the route for exporting its own oil. All in all, both the straits are indispensable routes. However, the geopolitical dynamics that make them vulnerable can severely affect global trade and oil transit.

*Roshni Ghosh is an M.A. candidate in International Relations at Symbiosis International University. She recently completed an internship at KIIPS from May to July 2025.