Trump 2.0: What It Means for Taiwan?

By Dr. K. Mansi

Published on December 11, 2024

The 5 November 2024 presidential and congressional elections in the United States gave the Grand Old Party (Republicans) a “trifecta”; the presidency plus the US House of Representatives and the Senate. With this, it became obvious that Trump 2.0 starting from January 2025 will be stronger than Trump’s first presidency. The result of the US elections has plunged the world into uncertainty and countries have started Trump-proofing themselves.

As per Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado, “the geopolitical landscape is set for a seismic shift” under Trump 2.0 and it will be “more keenly felt in the delicate and contentious relationship between the United States and China over Taiwan”. Trump’s presidency will mark a considerable shift from value based foreign policy of the Biden era, like supporting democracy globally as a major foreign policy priority. This also formed a major pillar of the support for Taiwan’s vibrant democracy to be protected from authoritarian China. Although Biden administration maintained that the US does not support Taiwan’s independence, Biden reiterated that the US would respond militarily if Taiwan was attacked by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Biden publicly made such pledges on six occasions.

Trump however has not made any such overt claims and has remained more ambiguous. Even during his first presidency, Trump had mentioned very little about Taiwan, and what he said in private was also not at all assuring for Taiwan.  During his 2024 presidential campaign, Trump was vocal about Taiwan but not always in a positive manner. For example, he remarked that Taiwan should pay more to the US for its defence,  accused Taiwan of stealing US chip industry, and he avoided directly answering whether he would defend Taiwan if China attacked.

Trump’s first presidency, however, left a strong and favourable impression on Taiwan across several important fronts including the economy, military and diplomacy. For instance, he launched the New Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) in 2020 to forge new economic ties between the US and Taiwan, signalled strong deterrence posturing in the Taiwan Strait, regularized the arms sales process to Taiwan, and enacted the Taiwan Travel Act (2018) to facilitate official exchanges between the two. The trend continued during the Biden administration which witnessed several high-profile visits and initiatives to strengthen ties despite Chinese objection. For example, the 2022 Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island nation triggered the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis and plunged the whole region into uncertainty. Additionally, the US arms sale to Taiwan continued. Both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Coast Guard cooperation in 2021 and initiated the US-Taiwan Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration (TTIC) to expand cooperation on critical supply chains.

Trump’s Foreign Policy Approach and Taiwan Question

The underlying rationale of Trump’s foreign policy has remained largely consistent, driven by a troika of unpredictability, transactionalism, and MAGA-style hyper nationalism. Additionally, his approach includes contempt for international institutions, pronounced reliance on rhetoric, hawkish media exaggerations, and the use of inflammatory language directed at both adversaries and allies. Besides all other Trump hallmarks, Trump 2.0 is going to be dominated by an anti-China stance, clearly reflected in his high-profile nominations. Many of the nominees particularly those focused on the security and the economic policy, are known for their hawkish views on China. Notable among them include Marco Rubio as the Secretary of State, Mike Waltz as the National Security Adviser, Pete Hegseth as the Secretary of Defense, Jamieson Greer as the Trade Representative, Peter Navarro as the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, Scott Bessent as the Secretary of the Treasury, and Howard Lutnick as the Secretary of Commerce.

These appointments reflect Trump’s own hawkish stance on China and most of his appointees and other individuals close to him like Mike Pompeo, Robert O’Brien, or Elbridge Colby are not just China hawks but also Taiwan advocates who can influence Trump’s Taiwan policy. For instance, Marco Rubio labels China as the “greatest threat to America” and is a strong supporter of Taiwan independence. Mike Waltz also shares the similar views and he supports arming Taiwan militarily and increasing its defence budget to deter China and maintain US hegemony in East Asia. He also believes that the US needs to do more in the Indo-Pacific region, and Taiwan’s strategic location in the first island chain cannot be taken for granted.

Despite the Republicans' strong focus on security in the Indo-Pacific to counter China threat, and a favourable legacy of the first Trump administration, there are several reasons to approach Trump 2.0 with caution when it comes to Taiwan.

Concerns Regarding Trump 2.0 and Taiwan

First, it is important to recognize the cardinal principles that have guided American policy toward China and Taiwan: The Three Communiqués (1972, 1978 and 1982), the Taiwan Relations Act (April 1979), and the Six Assurances (August 1982). These have also served as a major deterrence to Chinese annexation of Taiwan by force. Trump’s unpredictability and strategic ambiguity to maintain a leverage over Beijing are key concerns when it comes to the question of US support for Taiwan in case China invades. At a time when China’s harassment of the island nation has become a new normal, American ambiguity could lead to an uncertain future for Taiwan, offering Beijing opportunities to discredit the US and demoralize Taiwan through disinformation campaigns. The fragile peace in the Taiwan Strait has been maintained so far due to a delicate balance between the One China Principle of the PRC, One China Policy of the US and Taiwan’s adjusted position on ‘One China’ to reflect the current reality. Any unilateral change in this balance will have a domino effect.

Second, Trump believes in burden sharing when it comes to security ties meaning that Taiwan would need to significantly increase its defence expenditures. Trump has already proposed that Taiwan’s defence spending should reach 10 percent of its GDP citing inevitability of an attack by China. Taiwan currently spends more than NATO’s baseline goal of 2 percent of GDP on defence, with defence spending projected at 2.45 percent of GDP in 2025.  However, spending 10 percent of GDP on defence will not be feasible due to structural fiscal weakness. Moreover, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan is divided, and the current ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party, does not have a legislative majority, making any significant fiscal reforms difficult.

Finally, despite all the anti-China rhetoric, like the imposition of flat 60 percent tariff on Chinese import to the US, it is probable that Trump can use Taiwan as leverage in negotiations with China to serve US industrial interests. His close aid Elon Musk, who wields considerable influence on Trump and has significant investments in China, can influence Trump’s China and Taiwan policy. Musk considers Taiwan as an integral part of China and has suggested that Taiwan problem can be resolved by giving China some control over Taiwan.

In sum, Taiwan, like rest of the world, faces uncertainty with the incoming Trump presidency. Things are more complicated for Taiwan as the US is its biggest and the only security provider, and any change in the US policy towards Taiwan could mean existential trouble for the island nation. For the US, loss of Taiwan to China would mean a catastrophic economic and diplomatic costs. Therefore, Trump's likely transactional approach will continue to provide security support for Taiwan, but Taiwan will likely face pressure to accelerate chip manufacturing in the US, decouple from China, and increase its purchases of American military equipment. In a way, it is clarion call for Taiwan to diversify its international engagement. The New Southbound Policy does provide a framework of cooperation with the countries in the Indo-Pacific. Its scope can further be expanded to include the emerging economies of the Global South.

*The Author is an Assistant Professor and also Coordinator for the Amity Centre for BRICS Studies, Amity University Haryana.

Disclaimer: The Views in the Article are of the Author

Image Credit : Nikkei Asia