Unconventional Conflict and Persistent Deadlock: Insights from India-Pakistan Relations

By Sukanya Talukdar*

Published on July 24, 2025

Since their independence in 1947, India and Pakistan—both nuclear-armed states—have maintained a hostile relationship based on division, unsolved territorial issues, and opposed national identities. Pakistan's strategic vision revolves around India as an existential threat. This attitude originates not just from historical trauma associated with partition and the Kashmir dispute, but also from Pakistan's fear of becoming politically, economically, and militarily eclipsed by a much larger and more globally influential India.

The loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war, which resulted in the formation of Bangladesh, exacerbated this concern, bolstering the narrative among Pakistani military and political circles that India aims to weaken or break Pakistan. This perception of vulnerability is embedded in Pakistan's national security policy, which views India as a persistent and principal opponent.

Following this perspective, Pakistan fought four conventional wars against India—in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999—all of which resulted in strategic defeat or stalemate. These repeated failures demonstrated the limitations of conventional warfare, particularly against a militarily and economically superior India. As a result, Pakistan's approach moved to asymmetric and proxy warfare, and terrorism became a tool of state policy. It began to sponsor and hide militant organisations in order to wage a low-cost, deniable battle against India, notably in Jammu and Kashmir. This policy enabled Pakistan to challenge India without inciting a full-fledged conflict, while also projecting its devotion to the Kashmir cause internally.

Despite various diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict resolution—such as the Simla Agreement (1972), the Agra Summit (2001), and the Composite Dialogue Process (notably in 1998 and later between 2004–2008)—efforts to establish a stable and cooperative framework have largely failed to yield lasting outcomes.

FAILURE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

These diplomatic failures have frequently been followed by episodes of cross-border terrorism, resulting in retaliatory military operations and significant civilian casualties on both sides. The enduring strategic rivalry is increasingly shaped by contemporary global political shifts, wherein both states are recalibrating their foreign policies to enhance international legitimacy, assert deterrence postures, and augment relative power capabilities. This competitive orientation continues to prioritize zero-sum strategic gains over the pursuit of sustainable peace-building and long-term diplomatic engagement, thereby perpetuating a fragile and conflict-prone regional security environment.

Pakistan has often recoiled from Track I diplomacy when it comes to resolving differences. The violation of ceasefires, provoking activities along the Line of Control as seen in Operation Gibraltar during the 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistani army’s infiltration into the Kargil district during the Kargil War (1999), despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between the two countries- the Simla Agreement (1972) has further proven the incapability of Pakistan to stick to peaceful methods of conflict resolution. The recent termination of the Simla Agreement, post India holding the Indus Water Treaty (1960) in abeyance, has further narrowed down the chances of diplomatic negotiations between both countries. 

 

PAKISTAN’S RELIANCE ON UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The major challenges between the two countries were mostly limited to insurgencies in the area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), which has seen a shift post the 1990s, wherein cross-border terrorism has been weaponized to disrupt the relations between the two countries. The IC-814 Hijack, also known as the Kandahar Hijack (1999), the 2001 Indian Parliament Attack, the 2005 Delhi serial blasts, the 2008 Mumbai Attacks, the 2016 Pathankot Airbase Attack, the 2016 Uri Attack, the 2017 Amarnath Yatra Attack, the 2019 Pulwama Attack and the most recent Pahalgam Attack on Indian tourists (2025), can be considered as the greatest examples of cross border terrorism that Pakistan has thoroughly funded and carried out against India, making the neighboring country the greatest threat to India’s national security as well as civilian security. Terrorist activities have further surged after the revocation of Article 370 by India.

 

TERRORISM AS A LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT

India-Pakistan ties remain significantly strained as a result of Pakistan's long-standing policy of developing and supporting cross-border terrorist organisations. Groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Hizbul Mujahideen continue to operate freely on Pakistani land, with the Pakistani establishment's assistance and protection. Pakistan's intention to hold state funerals for terrorists killed during India's Operation Sindoor in 2025 demonstrates its determination to use terrorism as a non-traditional warfare instrument to destabilise India and weaken its national security.

In response to these prevalent provocations, India's counter-terrorism policy has taken an important and assertive shift. India has shifted from a defensive and diplomatically restrained attitude in previous decades to a strategy of stern and punitive reaction. This shift began to take shape following high-profile incidents such as the 2016 Uri attack, and it was plainly reflected in the subsequent surgical strikes carried out by Indian special forces across the Line of Control. The approach was reiterated during the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, which saw the Indian Air Force attack Jaish-e-Mohammed training centres deep within Pakistan. This idea of preemptive and precise military response was further reinforced with Operation Sindoor (2025), when India carried out another limited but strategic attack.

 These military actions were not covert, but rather carefully planned limited offensives aimed at neutralising terrorist threats and sending a strong message of deterrence. They reflect a new Indian security doctrine, one that prioritises citizens' safety through active engagement rather than passive restraint. India has also attempted to get worldwide support for its operations by presenting proof of Pakistan's involvement in terrorist harbouring and advocating for global acknowledgement of its right to self-defence.

 In contrast, Pakistan continues to deny the presence of terrorist camps on its territory, claiming that Indian strikes violate its sovereignty. It also seeks to balance the story by accusing India of supporting separatist activities in Balochistan. These opposing viewpoints have only worsened the diplomatic chasm, with both countries holding the other accountable for undermining regional peace and security. However, India's emerging doctrine is a dramatic break from the past, indicating zero tolerance for terrorism and a willingness to act unilaterally in defence of national interests.

 

NUCLEAR DYNAMICS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Since South Asia's open nuclearisation in 1998, India and Pakistan have mainly avoided full-fledged war, with nuclear deterrent playing an important role in ensuring strategic stability. However, Pakistan does not accept the No First Use (NFU) principle and retains a first-use strategy, which it claims is vital to counter India's conventional military dominance. Pakistan has built a full-spectrum deterrence posture, including tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), which could theoretically be employed on the battlefield in reaction to an Indian conventional incursion. This policy reflects Pakistan's strong dread of being overwhelmed in a conventional confrontation, as well as an attempt to dissuade limited Indian military actions, such as surgical strikes. Pakistan's frequent nuclear posturing in reaction to conventional Indian military operations, has generated major doubts about the regional deterrence's credibility and longevity.

From a strategic culture standpoint, this form of nuclear signalling represents a concerning deviation from the standards of responsible nuclear stewardship. Pakistan's tendency to use nuclear threats not just in severe circumstances, but also in reaction to conventional or even political pressure, has lowered the nuclear threshold and increased the risk of escalation. While Pakistan claims that such a posture is required to deter India's conventional military dominance, in fact, it has exploited nuclear deterrence to justify cross-border terrorism and proxy warfare.

This reliance on nuclear threats threatens regional stability and raises concerns about Pakistan's command and control reliability. Unlike responsible nuclear nations, who view such weapons as a last resort, Pakistan looks to utilise its arsenal as a tool for coercion, blurring the boundary between deterrence and provocation. Its actions not only destabilise South Asia, but also threaten global nonproliferation standards.

 Given this pattern, it is increasingly argued that Pakistan has proven itself unfit for the responsibilities that come with nuclear power. Its actions demonstrate a desire to use nuclear deterrence for tactical and political benefit, rather than strategic caution, posing a severe threat to regional and world security. As a result, Pakistan's nuclear behaviour requires more international scrutiny and pressure to preserve nuclear responsibility norms.

 

THIRD PARTY COMPONENTS IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

The India-Pakistan rivalry now includes a major third-party component as a result of Pakistan's growing strategic and economic ties with China, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The infrastructural projects of CPEC cross India's disputed region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), raising strategic concerns for India. When considered in conjunction with the continuing Sino-Indian border tensions, New Delhi views China's actions in this disputed area as both a breach of its sovereignty and an instance of strategic encirclement. South Asia's geopolitical instability has increased due to the emergence of the India-Pakistan-China triangle, which has led to what academics refer to as "nested security dilemmas," in which third-party alignments aggravate bilateral disputes.

 The trade relations between both nations have also been halted after the Pulwama Attack (2019) after India revoked the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status of Pakistan. The rivalry between the two countries has also paralyzed the South Asian regional alliance- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, with both countries aligning towards alternatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BMISTEC), Pakistan aligning with China regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

 

CONCLUSION

One of the few examples of India-Pakistan collaboration has long been the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which was mediated by the World Bank in 1960. However, India put the pact in abeyance following the Pahalgam terror attack, indicating a change to a security-driven policy. Asserting that diplomacy cannot coexist with cross-border terrorism, New Delhi has made it plain that any interaction with Pakistan will be limited to counterterrorism.

 Threats of escalation made by former Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari demonstrate Pakistan's reluctance to accept accountability for terrorist action occurring on its territory. In his statement that "blood and water cannot flow together," Prime Minister Narendra Modi reflects India's stance that mutual trust must precede cooperation. This recalibration is a measured and principled response to ongoing security risks, not a rejection of diplomacy.

With escalating tensions and in the absence of an agreement-enforcing mechanism, the South Asian nuclear powers are still a long way from achieving sustained peace and collaboration. Finding a common consensus for the Kashmir issue is a far cry, but both countries can start with solving cross-border terrorism issues as an initiative to mend their relations.

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*Sukanya Talukar is a Master's in International Studies at Christ University, Begaluru and interned with KIIPS from May-July 2025.